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This Article gives form to a presently amorphous, but vital, legal con-
cept: the Doctrine of Necessity ("Doctrine"). Skilled bankruptcy lawyers
and judges often invoke this ill-defined Doctrine at the beginning of a reor-
ganization case to authorize the postpetition payment of prepetition em-
ployee wages, benefits and services when the failure to make those payments
would be catastrophic. A general rule in bankruptcy reorganizations re-
quires payment of prepetition debts to be made solely through a confirmed
plan of reorganization. The Doctrine permits payment of prepetition debts
prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization.
There is no reference in the Bankruptcy Code ("Code") to the Doctrine.
There is no case, on any level, which states under what circumstances the
Doctrine may or may not be used. The Doctrine is, however, well-estab-
lished in bankruptcy common law. When used properly, it is one of the
most important tools at the disposal of bankruptcy judges. This is particu-
larly evident in the early stages of cases involving Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions. Bankruptcy is a collective process, and the Doctrine comports with
* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Eastern District of Wisconsin.
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the underlying policies and goals of bankruptcy. Creditors realize that it is
in their best interests to permit certain prepetition creditors to be paid im-
mediately, for if those creditors are not paid at once, everyone will suffer.
This Article is based on a compendium of what is available from all
possible sources, such as numerous unreported decisions, orders, motions,
briefs, discussions with bankruptcy judges and lawyers experienced in the
use of the Doctrine, and extensive personal experience. The authors have
discussed the Doctrine with bankruptcy judges throughout the country.
The use of the Doctrine throughout the United States is almost always
within the parameters stated in this Article. Many of the cases referred to
in this Article are from the bankruptcy courts for the Southern District of
New York. Those courts have been active in the development of the Doc-
trine and have the greatest concentration of reported and unreported deci-
sions and orders pertaining to the Doctrine.
This Article delineates common fact patterns and factors whose pres-
ence signals an appropriate use of the Doctrine. It also illustrates what
notice is typically given prior to use of the Doctrine and identifies the per-
sons who generally receive notice, for giving proper notice is of critical im-
portance to the use of the Doctrine. The parameters of the Doctrine are
explored and defined, cases are reviewed, and recommendations for use of
the Doctrine are given. The authors conclude that the Doctrine, when
properly understood and applied following appropriate notice, is supported
by history, practice, case law, the Code and sound bankruptcy policy, and is
properly a part of modern bankruptcy law.
II. THE DOCTRINE DEFINED
The Doctrine of Necessity is a principle used in bankruptcy law which
permits the use of certain provisions of the Code or common law ostensibly
in contradiction to other law in order to accomplish a vital objective in a
bankruptcy case. The Doctrine exists simply because it works. The proper
use of the Doctrine helps to stabilize a debtor's business relationships with-
out significantly hurting any party.
III. BASES OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Historical Basis
It is important to understand the history of the Doctrine of Necessity,
since the parameters of the Doctrine are still undergoing active develop-
ment in the bankruptcy courts. A related doctrine, the Necessity of Pay-
ment Rule, applies in railroad cases and has existed at least since 1882.
Although the two doctrines are different, the Doctrine of Necessity is a
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natural evolution of the Necessity of Payment Rule. The principle underly-
ing both doctrines is the same: Sometimes immediate payment to a prepeti-
tion creditor will make the creditors as a group better off.
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the Necessity of Pay-
ment Rule in Miltenberger v. Logansport Railway.' In Miltenberger, inter-
line railroads threatened to cease furnishing supplies and interline traffic
exchanges unless the railroad receiver immediately paid pre-receivership
claims.2 The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court order directing the
railroad receiver to pay the pre-receivership claims prior to reorganization.
The Court found that such payments are "necessary ... where a stoppage
of... [indispensable] business relations would be a probable result ....
Modem cases continue to apply the Necessity of Payment Rule in rail-
road reorganizations. In In re Boston and Maine Corp.,' the court defined
the Necessity of Payment Rule as "the existence of a judicial power to au-
thorize trustees in reorganization to pay claims where such payment is ex-
acted as the price of providing goods or services indispensably necessary to
continuing the rail service . ... "I
Similarly, in In re Lehigh and New England Railway Co.,6 the court
declared that "the 'necessity of payment' doctrine ... [permits] immediate
payment of claims of creditors where those creditors will not supply serv-
ices or material essential to the conduct of the business until their pre-reor-
ganization claims shall have been paid."7  The Third Circuit went on to
note that "the sine qua non for the application of the 'necessity of payment'
doctrine is the possibility that the creditor will employ an immediate eco-
nomic sanction, failing such payment."'
The Necessity of Payment Rule is periodically confused with another
principle of railroad reorganizations, the Six Months Rule, codified in sub-
section 1171(b) of the Code's railroad reorganization subchapter.9 The Six
Months Rule was recognized in subsection 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 10
and Congress may have intended that subsection 1171(b) operate to con-
tinue the Six Months Rule. 1' The Six Months Rule permits claims for serv-
1. 106 U.S. 286 (1882).
2. Id. at 311.
3. Id. at 311-12.
4. 634 F.2d 1359 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981).
5. Id. at 1382.
6. 657 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1981).
7. Id. at 581 (quoting In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 102 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972)).
8. Id.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1982).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (repealed 1976).
11. In re B & W Enterprises, Inc., 713 F.2d 534, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1983).
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ices and goods supplied to a railroad six months before filing to be paid as
administrative expense priority claims.12 The Six Months Rule requires
that "the creditor must have expected to be paid out of the current operat-
ing receipts of the railroad rather than from the general credit of the rail-
road" and that "a current debt fund must exist."' 13 The debt fund is limited
to "current or surplus earnings during the six months prior to reorganiza-
tion and during reorganization; unmortgaged assets of the debtor; and in-
come diverted for the benefit of mortgagees of the debtor during the
reorganization or the six months prior to the reorganization."' 4 These fac-
tors are rarely found in modern Chapter 11 cases.
There are important distinctions between the Doctrine of Necessity, the
Necessity of Payment Rule and the Six Months Rule. The Six Months Rule
and the Necessity of Payment Rule apply only to railroad reorganizations
and not to businesses generally. They have no counterpart in Chapter 11
non-railroad reorganizations. Railroad reorganizations present a particular
set of circumstances, such as the impact of Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion regulations and the Railway Labor Act, that is not wholly present in
Chapter 11 business reorganizations.
The Necessity of Payment Rule applies only to essential goods or serv-
ices and not to employee wages or benefits. It applies only to avoid credi-
tors' threatened economic sanctions and not to avoid a harsh result on
retirees, employees, or consumers. The Necessity of Payment Rule and its
litigated cases dwell on payment to creditors, rather than to employees, and
it does not involve the problems of foreign creditors or tort victims.
Whereas the Necessity of Payment Rule is a rule of payment, the Six
Months Rule is one of priority. The rationale for the Six Months Rule is
that suppliers' claims accruing postpetition will also receive an administra-
tive expense priority. The rationale for the Necessity of Payment rule is
that, unless the trustee pays a prepetition claim, the claimant will cease
providing the railroad with essential goods or services indispensably neces-
sary to continued operations.
Nonetheless, the Necessity of Payment Rule and the Doctrine of Neces-
sity share the same underlying policy rationale. Both principles are pre-
mised on the bankruptcy goal of maintaining the prospects for a viable
reorganization during the early stages of a case. Both principles embody
the fact that there are some prepetition creditors who must be paid immedi-
ately because if they are not paid, everyone else will suffer. If payment of
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b).
13. 2 W. NORTON, BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 48.16, at 48-23 (1981).
14. Id. at 48-23 to -24.
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certain prepetition debts is necessary to achieve an effective early reorgani-
zation, both legal principles authorize payment. The Necessity of Payment
Rule is not coextensive with the Doctrine of Necessity; rather, it is the his-
torical basis from which courts have begun to fashion a legal principle re-
sponsive to the unique needs of parties in a Chapter 11 case.
B. Statutory Provisions
Support for the use of the Doctrine can be found in various provisions of
the Code. No Code provision, however, explicitly authorizes the use of the
Doctrine.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
Subsection 105(a) is most commonly cited as authority for the Doctrine.
It states in part: "The [bankruptcy] court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title."15 In practice, courts use Section 105 sparingly.
Collier takes a broad view regarding the utilization of subsection 105(a)
to support paying prepetition debts with postpetition funds. It states that
the purpose of subsection 105(a) is "to enable the court to do whatever is
necessary to aid in its jurisdiction, i.e., anything arising in or relating to a
bankruptcy case."16 Former Bankruptcy Judge Robert L. Ordin addressed
the issue directly when he wrote:
Prepetition debts of the same class are often treated differently in
reorganization cases when the court is confronted with special cir-
cumstances. In many instances, particularly in the early stages of
the case, a court may authorize the payment of prepetition debts in
order to preserve the potential for rehabilitation. This is particularly
true where the operation would otherwise terminate with disastrous
effects. 17
The broad grant of authority pursuant to subsection 105(a) is not limit-
less. Appellate courts repeatedly caution bankruptcy courts that equitable
powers are constrained by the dictates of the Code.1 The United States
15. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
16. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.02, at 105-4 (1988).
17. R. Ordin, Finality of Order of Bankruptcy Court, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 177 (1980).
18. See, e.g., Levit, Trustee of V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co. v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874
F.2d 1186, 1198 n.10 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Whatever force the assertion ... that 'equitable principles
govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction' may have had under the 1898 Act, this approach
has no place under the Code to the extent the statute addresses the question."); In re Longardner
& Assoc., 855 F.2d 455, 462 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 1130 (1988)
(quoting In re Chicago M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 830 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 1987)) ("Although a
reorganization court is indeed a court of equity ... it is yet constrained by the dictates of the
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Supreme Court stated that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bank-
ruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code."19 The message from the higher courts is clear: Section
105 grants equitable powers to bankruptcy courts, but the courts must pro-
ceed with great caution. There are limits to this power, and a higher court
can reverse the bankruptcy court should the higher court deem it appropri-
ate to do so.
The analysis of the constraints seemingly imposed by other Code provi-
sions distinguishes courts willing to rely on Section 105 and use the Doc-
trine from those who reject its use. Courts rejecting the use of Section 105
to authorize postpetition payments of prepetition obligations usually rule
that such payments upset the priority scheme of Section 507 and fail to
treat alike all similarly situated creditors in accordance with Section 1122.20
Courts relying on Section 105 usually rule that the priority scheme of Sec-
tion 507 is not inflexible and that Section 1122 only applies to plan
confirmation.2
1
The Doctrine is a legal concept premised on a perception of the Code as
a flexible mechanism to effectuate the rehabilitative purposes of bankruptcy.
Although the Doctrine may seemingly conflict with some Code provisions,
the inherent equitable powers of subsection 105(a) can, and should, support
the Doctrine's use to achieve the goal of flexibility in the Code.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1481
The attempted utilization of 28 U.S.C. § 148122 ("Section 1481") as a
foundation for the Doctrine has been limited, other than as part of a "shot
gun" approach in which every possible legal theory is applied. Section 1481
provides that "[a] bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of
equity, law and admiralty .... ,,23 The utilization of subsection 105(a) has
Bankruptcy Act."); Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey ("A.H. Robins"), 832 F.2d
299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962, 108 S. Ct. 1228 (1988) ("While the equitable
powers emanating from § 105(a) are quite important in the general bankruptcy scheme[,] ... these
equitable powers are not a license for a court to disregard the clear language and meaning of the
bankruptcy statutes and rules.").
19. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
20. See A.H. Robins, 832 F.2d at 302; In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 Bankr. 922, 929-33
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re FCX, Inc., 60 Bankr. 405, 410-11 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
21. See In re Chateaugay Corp. ("LTV"), 80 Bankr. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("A rigid
application of the priorities of [Section] 507 would be inconsistent with the fundamental purpose
of reorganization and of the Act's grant of equity powers to bankruptcy courts, which is to create
a flexible mechanism that will permit the greatest likelihood of survival of the debtor and payment
of creditors in full or at least proportionately.").




been considered to be a "cleaner" approach. Courts, in general, have disfa-
vored the sole utilization of Section 1481.24
3. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)
Subsection 365(b), which pertains to executory contracts, has been used
by a number of bankruptcy courts to justify use of the Doctrine. Subsection
365(b) states in part:
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such con-
tract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract or
lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee
will promptly cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the
trustee will promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor
to such contract or lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such
party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance
under such contract or lease.25
Pursuant to subsection 1107(a), a debtor in possession has all of the
rights and powers, and performs all the functions and duties, of a Chapter
11 trustee. This includes decision-making as to executory contracts. The
Code does not define an executory contract. One author defines an execu-
tory contract as "a contract under which (a) debtor and non-debtor each
have unperformed obligations, and (b) the debtor, if it ceased further per-
formance, would have no right to the other party's continued performance"
("Andrew definition").26 The classic definition of an executory contract is
"a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the per-
formance of the other" ("Countryman definition"). 27
The use of the executory contract analogy is appealing due to its under-
lying theory of assumption of contract. One court stated that "[i]n order to
24. The typical method of attempted utilization of Section 1481 is illustrated in FCX, 60
Bankr. at 408.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1982).
26. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding Rejection, 59 U. COLO. L.
REV. 845, 893 (1988).
27. Countryman, Executory Contract in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973). Because Professor Countryman's definition at times is too rigid to achieve the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Code, we have adopted the Andrew definition for this Article. See D. BAIRD & T.
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 455 (1985).
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assume an executory contract under section 365, a debtor must satisfy the
'business judgment' test - i.e., it must be established that assumption rep-
resents a sound business judgment on the part of the debtor."'28 The sound
business judgment of a debtor who desires to use the Doctrine is to make
the proposed payment.
Furthermore, the debtor, as employer, and the employees may view the
terms and conditions of employment as an executory contract which must
be assumed for the employees to continue to work postpetition. The em-
ployment relationship falls within the Andrew definition of executory con-
tract more smoothly than within the Countryman definition. Correctly or
incorrectly, most bankruptcy courts, at least to date, use the Countryman
definition of an executory contract, which can result in their failure to em-
brace the executory contract theory as a basis for utilizing the Doctrine.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 507
Many courts approve a limited use of the Doctrine by oblique applica-
tion of subsections 507(a)(3) and (4), which pertain to priorities of expenses
and claims. Subsection 507(a)(3) gives a third priority to "unsecured claims
for wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance and sick
leave pay" limited to $2,000 per individual earned within 90 days of the
earlier of commencement of the case or cessation of the debtor's business.29
Subsection 507(a)(4) gives a fourth priority to "unsecured claims for contri-
butions to an employee benefit plan . . . arising from services rendered
within 180 days before the date of the filing of the petition" and limited to
$2,000 per employee adjusted for payments under other subsections.30
Courts which reject a broad use of the Doctrine often permit more limited
payment pursuant to subsections 507(a)(3) and (4), if there are sufficient
available funds to do so.3" Although subsections 507(a)(3) and (4) state
that wages, salaries and certain other benefits are entitled to priority, they
do not authorize immediate payment of those benefits. Courts which use
subsection 507(a) to authorize immediate payment often glide over this
distinction.
28. Structurlite, 86 Bankr. at 925 n.4 (citing inter alia Group of Institutional Investors v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943)).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1982).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4).
31. See, e.g., Structurlite, 86 Bankr. at 933 (permitting limited payment pursuant to subsec-




5. 11 U.S.C. § 363
Section 363 is often used as a basis for the application of the Doctrine,
particularly in the Second Circuit. Subsection 363(b) states that "[t]he
trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate."32 Subsection 363(c)(1)
permits a debtor who is authorized to operate a business to enter into trans-
actions and to use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business,
without notice or a hearing.33
Although an argument against using Section 363 in a manner which
supersedes other provisions of the Code can be made, the use of Section 363
in the indicated cases has certainly resulted in pragmatic and equitable re-
sults, and it is difficult to argue against something which works smoothly,
effectively and successfully. Another advantage of utilizing Section 363 is
that it can be read clearly and literally to permit a court to authorize the
debtor to use property other than in the ordinary course of business. With
the swing of certain appellate courts to a literal interpretation of the Code,
utilization of subsections 363(b) and (c) is becoming increasingly attractive,
especially when combined with other bases.
6. Miscellaneous Bankruptcy Code Provisions
Courts have also utilized other provisions of the Code in ruling that the
Doctrine may be applied. In Eastern Air Lines,34 a Doctrine-based ticket-
holder relief program was founded not only upon subsection 363(c)(1), but
32. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1982).
33. These provisions are broad and attractive in the context of the Doctrine. As a result, they
have been used with some regularity. See, eg., In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Case No. 89 B 10449
(BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989), and its companion case, In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,
Case No. 89 B 10448 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989). In Eastern Air Lines and Ionosphere
Clubs the court stated:
A bankruptcy court is empowered pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to authorize
a debtor to expend funds in the bankruptcy court's discretion outside the ordinary course
of business. Section 363(b) gives the court broad flexibility in tailoring its orders to meet a
wide variety of circumstances. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983).
However, the debtor must articulate some business justification, other than mere appease-
ment of major creditors, for using, selling or leasing property out of the ordinary course of
business, before the court may permit such disposition under § 363(b). Id. at 1070; accord,
In re ContinentalAir Lines [sic], Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Baldwin-
United Corp., 43 Bankr. 888, 905-06 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
98 Bankr. 174, 175 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (These cases will be referred to collectively as "In re
Eastern Air Lines, Inc." or "Eastern Air Lines."). Section 363 was also utilized effectively in the
three LTV decisions, In re Chateaugay Corp., 80 Bankr. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); 76 Bankr. 945
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); 64 Bankr. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), appeals dismissed, 838 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1988).
34. 98 Bankr. 174.
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also upon sections 1107 and 1108. Subsection 1107(a) gives a debtor in
possession the powers of a trustee. Section 1108 authorizes the trustee to
operate the debtor's business unless the court orders otherwise. It is doubt-
ful that either of these Code sections would be utilized in other than a sup-
porting capacity when a court decides to use the Doctrine.
At least one court in the Seventh Circuit used the Doctrine relying en-
tirely on subsection 549(a), which provides in part that, with limitations,
"[t]he trustee may avoid a [postpetition] transfer of property of the estate
• . .that is not authorized under this title or by the court."35 The reasoning
is simple. If the court authorizes the transfer in the form of payment pursu-
ant to the Doctrine, the transfer may not be avoided. Whether subsection
549(a) can be read to confer upon a court the right to authorize a postpeti-
tion transfer not otherwise authorized by the Code is subject to debate.
Nonetheless, this is an interesting approach.
C. "'Lien-Like" Theory
At legal seminars, more than one respected commentator has expressed
the belief that employees who insist upon postpetition payment for prepeti-
tion services have a "lien-like" claim which entitles them to payment. A
computer search failed to show any clear instance of the use of this theory
in a reported decision. This theory could, under very limited circum-
stances, be of nominal help in Wisconsin. Wisconsin has a statute36 which
gives unpaid employees a super-priority lien on all assets of the employer
for unpaid wages. A bankruptcy court recently held, however, that this
statute is inapplicable when the employer is insolvent.37
The use of the term "lien-like" is not uncommon.38 In In re Hoffman,39
the court referred to a reading by the Ninth Circuit "as a lien-like limitation
on the aggregate of rights which comprise a liquor license .... ",4o The
application of this theory is still in its infancy stage.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1982).
36. Wis. STAT. § 109.09(2) (1988).
37. In re Napco Graphic Arts, Inc., 51 Bankr. 757 (E.D. Wis. 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
83 Bankr. 558 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
38. See, e.g., In re Lowery Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1979), which in reference to
FLA. STAT. § 713.15 (1977) held that while the statute "does not create a lien on real property [it]
still creates a lien-like right which we consider a lien." Lowery Bros., 589 F.2d at 860.
39. 65 Bankr. 985 (D. R.I. 1986).
40. Id. at 993 (referencing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-7-24 (1987)).
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D. Analogy to Related Law
A few courts have looked to related law for guidance. For example, the
court in Eastern Air Lines41 looked to the Railway Labor Act42 and, specifi-
cally, to the Six Months Rule which permits payment to creditors for goods
delivered within six months before the filing, where the goods were neces-
sary to keep the railroad in business. The court found that these bank-
ruptcy cases were "related in some aspects to the Railway Labor Act."'43
The court also looked to the Necessity of Payment Rule and continued:
Even if this case is not directly covered by the Railway Labor Act,
the [necessity of payment] doctrine would still be applicable under
the rationale of Judge Learned Hand who applied this rule to a non-
railroad debtor in Dudley v. Mealey. In that case, Judge Learned
Hand held that a court was not "helpless" to apply the rule to non-
railroad debtors where the alternative was a cessation of
operations. 44
In B & W Enterprises,' the use of the Six Months Rule and/or the
Necessity of Payment Rule in any case other than a Chapter 11 railroad
reorganization was rejected. So much for uniformity. In many cases, no
legal basis for utilization of the Doctrine was stated.4
E. Common Law
The most common basis for the use of the Doctrine is by utilization of
common law, specifically, by reference to other cases where the Doctrine
was used. Motions and supporting briefs regularly refer to the same cases
in which the Doctrine was successfully applied. There is much to be said
for stare decisis.
IV. WHAT CAN BE PAID
Courts have authorized payment of numerous kinds of prepetition debts
pursuant to the Doctrine. Although each use of the Doctrine is, and must
41. 98 Bankr. at 174.
42. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-1213 (1982) (cited in Eastern Air Lines, 98 Bankr. at 176).
43. Eastern Air Lines, 98 Bankr. at 176.
44. Id.
45. 713 F.2d at 537.
46. See In re Global Marine, Case Nos. 85-00771-112-11 to 86-00782-H2-11 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Feb. 13, 1986) (order authorizing prepetition payments to Scottish and English vendors); In
re Revere Copper and Brass Inc., Case Nos. 82 B 12073 to -12086 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1982)
(order authorizing debtors-in-possession to reimburse employees' business expenses); In re KDT
Indus., Case Nos. 82 B 11453 to -11515, 82 B 11687 to -11718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1982)
(order authorizing debtors to reimburse travel expenses incurred by employees).
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be, fact-specific, there is a pattern to the use of the Doctrine. Many orders
contain authorization for more than one category of payment, e.g., wages
and pension benefits. Other orders permit payment of only one category,
e.g., wages. Many orders are variations on the same theme.
A. Payments to, or on Behalf of Employees
The most common use of the Doctrine is to pay benefits related to em-
ployment. Eastern Air Lines was authorized "to pay the Prepetition Em-
ployee Obligations to currently active employees."'47 The Debtor's motion
defined "Prepetition Employee Obligations" to include "wages, salaries, re-
imbursable business expenses and health benefits."48
In contrast, the same court, in deciding another employee issue,49 de-
nied a request of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers ("IAM") "for an order directing payment of certain prepetition
wage, salary and medical benefits to IAM [which] represented striking
employees." 5 °
Allis-Chalmers Corporation and its related corporations were
authorized:
to pay to their current employees and directors. . . all wages, fees,
salaries and commissions. . . which have accrued. . . within the
ninety (90) days immediately prior to the filing of the Debtors'
Chapter 11 petitions, provided, however, that such accrued wage,
salary and commission payments shall not exceed, in the aggregate,
the sum of $15 million.5
Continental Airlines and Texas International Airlines were permitted "to
pay those employees on permanent active payroll status the amounts of their
prepetition claims for salary, insurance benefits and out of pocket
expenses." 52
47. In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Case No. 89 B 10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989)
(order authorizing payment of prepetition obligations to foreign creditors).
48. Id.
49. In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 98 Bankr. 174, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
50. Id. at 179.
51. In re Hartman Material Handling Sys. ("Allis-Chalmers"), Case Nos. 87 B 11225, to
-11242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1987) (amended order authorizing payment of pre-petition
wages and salaries, business expenses and other employee benefits) (emphasis added).
52. In re Continental Airlines Corp., Consolidated Case No. 83-04019-HI-5 (Bankr. S.D.




Courts have also permitted debtors to pay prepetition business expenses
for currently active employees. In In re KDT Industries, Inc. " the court
authorized the Debtor:
to reimburse its employees' out-of-pocket expenses, relating to
travel, moving and related business expenses incurred by said em-
ployees prior to the filing of the within Chapter 11 petitions in an
aggregate amount not to exceed $160,000 by paying to each em-
ployee entitled to reimbursement hereunder a sum not to exceed
$500.00 with and in addition to each payroll check hereafter re-
ceived by such employee until all reimbursement to which such em-
ployee is entitled shall be paid in full. 4
Other courts also have authorized the payment of prepetition expenses. 5
In some cases, the authorization for payment to employees was stated in
general terms. In In re McLean Industries,5 6 the court authorized the Debt-
ors "to pay wage, salary and employee business expenses, accrued but un-
paid as of the commencement of these Chapter 11 cases, not to exceed in
the aggregate the sum of $3,871,000."1 7 In addition, the Debtors were al-
lowed "to implement and make deductions from payments of wages and
salaries for union dues, savings plans, and other wage and salary 'check-
offs' and deductions in accordance with past practices."58
In In re Patrick Cudahy, Inc., 9 the court permitted payment to all
prepetition employees holding uncashed payroll checks. This case was
marked by extremely acrimonious and lengthy labor disputes. The Debtor
was authorized to issue replacement checks to former, present and laid-off
employees holding uncashed payroll checks for salary earned within ninety
days of the date of the commencement of the case. The court authorized
payment to holders of prepetition garnishment checks and tax lien checks
which had not cleared the banks before the petition was filed.
The court authorized payment of subsection 507(a) priority claims in
In re Revere Copper and Brass.60 In In re FCX, Inc.,6 the Debtor was not
53. Case Nos. 82 B 11453 to -11515, 82 B 11687 to -11718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1982).
54. Id.
55. Eastern Air Lines, Case No. 89 B 10449; Allis-Chalmers, Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242;
In re McLean Indus., Case Nos. 86 B 12238, 12241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1986); and In re
Revere Copper and Brass, Case Nos. 82 B 12073 to -12086 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1982) (pay-
ment to employees for out-of-pocket business expenses incurred prepetition in an aggregate
amount not to exceed $50,000).
56. Case Nos. 86 B 12238, 86 B 12241.
57. Id. at 1.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Case No. 87-05413 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 1989).
60. Case Nos. 82 B 12073 to -12086 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1982).
61. 60 Bankr. 405 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
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authorized to permit payment of unpaid payroll expenses or taxes, except to
the extent wages were entitled to subsection 507(a)(3) priority. Payroll de-
ductions, including employee benefit plan contributions and union dues for
current employees, were paid in Hartman, the Allis-Chalmers cases. 62
Payment of severance benefits for current employees and former em-
ployees was ordered of McLean Industries. The court permitted McLean
Industries "to pay [its] employees and former employees severance or em-
ployment termination benefits which have accrued or will accrue by virtue
of past service, in accordance with the debtor['s] existing severance policies,
not to exceed in the aggregate the sum of $100,000. ' '63
One court has gone one step further in authorizing payments. Payment
of all prepetition employee obligations of those employees who were still
working postpetition appears to have been authorized in Eastern Air
Lines. Some courts have permitted the payment of vacation pay, as was
done in Allis-Chalmers.65
Courts regularly approve payment of prepetition obligations for workers
compensation, medical benefits, insurance claims, and insurance premiums
for current employees. Payment of prepetition medical benefits and medi-
cal insurance for currently active employees is almost as common as pay-
ment of prepetition wage claims. Prepetition medical benefits of active
employees were paid in both Eastern Air Lines66 and Allis-Chalmers.67
Medical insurance for active and retired employees was paid in McLean
Industries.6" The Debtors were "authorized and empowered to continue in
effect all medical insurance coverage for all active and retired employees in
accordance with past practice and to provide such coverage for all laid off
employees for a period not to exceed the later of (i) three months following
the date of the lay off; or (ii) sixty (60) days following the date of the filing
of the Debtors' Chapter 11 petitions., 69
Life and disability insurance premiums for active and retired employees
were also paid in Revere Copper and Brass.7 ° The Debtors were "author-
ized and empowered to maintain in effect and pay all premiums in respect
62. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242.
63. McLean Indu&, Case Nos. 86 B 12238, 86 B 12241.
64. Case No. 89 B 10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
65. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242 (payment of all wages, fees, salaries and commissions
including holiday pay).
66. Case No. 89 B 10449.
67. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242.
68. Case Nos. 86 B 12238, 86 B 12241.
69. Id.
70. Case Nos. 82 B 12073, 82 B 12086.
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of the [D]ebtors' life and disability insurance coverage and to continue such
coverage for their active and retired employees."71 The court also approved
payment of medical, life, disability and workers compensation benefits for
past and present employees.72
In In re Chateaugay Corp. ("LTV"),7 3 the court held that the bank-
ruptcy court had the equitable power to authorize payment of some, but not
all, prepetition workers' compensation claims. Payment of similar benefits
appears to have been made in Allis-Chalmers.74
Insurance claims of former employees of Continental Airlines were paid
when the court "authorized [Continental Airlines] to apply the amount of
$500,000.00 toward insurance claims in excess of $2,500.00 of former em-
ployees that are not presently working for the Debtors."7"
B. Payments to Suppliers and Consumers
It is not uncommon for courts to authorize payments to vital suppliers
and customers. In Patrick Cudahy,76 the court authorized the Debtor to
pay certain sellers of livestock, although payment in due course might have
been authorized pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 196"7 had the court found that the
Debtor held funds in trust. Another bankruptcy court authorized Wilson
Foods Corporation "to expend in its discretion a sum not to exceed five
million in the aggregate to pay essential pre-chapter 11 obligations."7"
The Eastern Air Lines case presented many unique problems, including
what to do with angry passengers who purchased tickets prepetition and/or
held air fare discount coupons. The court authorized Eastern Air Lines to
implement a ticket-holder relief program whereby consumers holding tick-
ets purchased prepetition could use those tickets on Eastern flights cur-
rently operating or could receive transferable air travel credits applicable
towards the purchase price of new Eastern tickets when Eastern resumed
service.79
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id.
73. 80 Bankr. 279, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
74. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242; see also McLean Indus., Case Nos. 86 B 12238, 86 B
12241.
75. Continental Airlines (Order of September 29, 1983), at 2.
76. Case No. 87-05413.
77. 7 U.S.C. § 196 (1988).
78. In re Wilson Foods Corp., Case No. 83-01034A (Bankr. W.D. Okla. April 22, 1983)
(order to maintain existing bank accounts, consolidate cash management and permit discretionary
payments).
79. Eastern Air Lines, Case Nos. 89 B 10448, 89 B 10449 (order of March 14, 1989).
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For a debtor to survive, it is often important to pay warranty claims. It
is no surprise that the bankruptcy court authorized Allis-Chalmers and its
related corporations "to honor and satisfy in their discretion all warranty
claims relating to products which are currently sold by the debtors in their
continuing business operations whether such claims were asserted prepeti-
tion or postpetition or related to sales consummated prepetition or
postpetition."8 0
What about immediate reconstructive surgery which was necessary due
to a faulty product of the debtor? The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court lacked the discretion to
permit A.H. Robins to establish a fund to make interim payments to
Dalkon Shield victims.
81
American Express Company received favorable treatment when a court
authorized payment of amounts owed to it for the prepetition use of
Crompton Company's American Express credit line.82 Apparently mem-
bership has its privileges for Amex, as well as for its members. This case is
uncharacteristic because an explanation for payment is not readily
available.
C. Payments to Foreign Creditors
Payments to foreign creditors, including foreign governments, are often
paid pursuant to the Doctrine. The reason, in part, is pragmatic: It is not
easy for courts to enforce the automatic stay in foreign countries, if the
automatic stay in fact applies outside the United States. Who is to enforce
the automatic stay in Colombia? It is no surprise that in Eastern Air
Lines,83 the court authorized the Debtor "to pay to foreign creditors prepe-
tition liabilities of the [D]ebtor incurred in the ordinary course of business,
as shall be necessary to protect and preserve assets of the estate or foreign
operations, in an amount not to exceed $13 million."84
In re Global Marine8 5 is another example of authorization given to pay
foreign creditors where "failure to satisfy such prepetition obligations will
result in the creation by operation of law of maritime liens against such
vessels, the disruption of the [D]ebtors' business and the dismemberment of
80. Allis-Chalmers, Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242 (order of August 24, 1987), at 2.
81. Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey ("A.H. Robins"), 832 F.2d 292, 302 (4th
Cir. 1987).
82. In re Crompton Co., Inc., Case No. 84 B 11496 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1985) (order
authorizing debtor to pay pre-petition claims of American Express Co.).
83. Case No. 89 B 10449.
84. Id. at 1-2.
85. Case Nos. 85 B 00771-H2, 86 00782-H2-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 1986).
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their estates."'8 6 The bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas
authorized Continental Airlines to pay foreign creditors an amount not to
exceed $2,000,000 for prepetition obligations, finding payment was "neces-
sary and essential in order for Continental to continue its business opera-
tions in foreign jurisdictions and to avoid the risk of the seizure of its
aircraft. 87
McLean Industries88 followed a similar pattern. The court permitted
the debtors to "pay supplemental compensation to employees in Europe,
the Middle East and Japan, accrued but unpaid as of the commencement of
these Chapter 11 cases, to the extent required by local law, not to exceed in
the aggregate the sum of $1,550,000. ' '89
In summary, and in general, what have been paid pursuant to the Doc-
trine are prepetition claims necessary to stabilize the debtor's relationship
with its current employees and service providers, or to avoid a harsh effect
on innocent parties. As case law continues to develop, new applications of
the Doctrine will emerge.
V. EXTENT OF THE DOCTRINE
The Doctrine cannot be used by implication to enjoin a labor strike.90
In the Fourth Circuit it cannot be used to pay creditors with unsecured
claims prior to the confirmation of a plan, even when reconstructive surgery
is urgently needed.91 It cannot be used in the Eastern District of North
Carolina to pay a farmer's purchasing and marketing cooperative's prepeti-
tion unpaid payroll expenses, unpaid payroll taxes and unpaid grain
purchases.92 It cannot be used in the Southern District of Ohio to pay
prepetition medical claims of the Debtor's employees. 93
VI. FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE COURT
A. No Objection Following Appropriate Notice
To no surprise, there is no consensus as to what factors or combinations
of factors must be present for the Doctrine to be applied. The most com-
86. Id. at 1.
87. Continental Airlines, Case No. 83 B 04019-H1-5 (Order of September 29, 1983), at 2.
88. Case Nos. 86 B 12238, 86 B 12241.
89. Id. at 1-2.
90. In re Crowe & Assocs., 16 Bankr. 271 (E.D. Mich. 1981), rev'd, 20 Bankr. 225 (E.D.
Mich. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983).
91. See A.H. Robins, 832 F.2d 292.
92. FCX, 60 Bankr. 405.
93. In re Structurlite Plastics, 86 Bankr. 922 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
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mon rationale given in orders and asserted in motions is a lack of objection
to proposed payments by any party with a substantial or meaningful inter-
est in the case. The law is not settled as to when a lack of an objection
constitutes an affirmative consent. Nonetheless, in the absence of an objec-
tion, relief is invariably granted. Case examples are In re KDT Industries,
Inc.94 and In re Revere Copper and Brass." In In re Eastern Air Lines,
Inc.,96 the court noted that the United States trustee had no objection to
proposed payments. In In re Hartman Material Handling Systems ("Allis-
Chalmers "),97 the court indicated that "no adverse interest ... [was] repre-
sented."9 That was also the case in In re Wilson Foods Corp. ,99 when relief
was granted after the court indicated that there was "no adverse interest
being represented and sufficient cause appearing therefor." 1" When the
Unsecured and Secured Creditors' Committees and the United States
trustee gave affirmative assent, the Doctrine was applied, and the requested
relief granted in In re Crompton Co, Inc.." ° I
If the bankruptcy process is to function at maximum efficiency, all par-
ties must be pragmatic. It is logical for a court to grant reasonable relief if
no interested party objects, provided that the court has jurisdiction and the
relief requested is not patently prohibited by the Code or established law.
On the other hand, when an objection is interposed, the court is less likely
to grant the requested relief.102
B. Location of the Debtor's Assets
The location of the debtor's assets can be important, especially if the
assets are not in the United States. In In re Global Marine,10 3 the court
applied the Doctrine after expressing concern about the creation of mari-
time liens against vessels if payment was not made, with a resultant disrup-
tion of the Debtors' business, and, perhaps, the Debtors' demise. Payment
was authorized also because "funds belonging to the [D]ebtors have been
frozen in Scotland and England by operation of law."" ° The court pointed
94. Case Nos. 82 B 11453 to -11515, 82 B 11687 to -11718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1982).
95. Case Nos. 82 B 12073, 82 B 12086 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1982).
96. Case No. 89 B 10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
97. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1987).
98. Id. at 1.
99. Case No. 83-01034A (Bankr. W.D. Okla. April 22, 1983).
100. Id. at 1.
101. Case No. 84 B 11496 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1986).
102. See Official Comm. of Equity See. Holders v. Mabey ("A.H. Robins"), 832 F.2d 299 (4th
Cir. 1987).
103. Case Nos. 85-00771-H2-11, 86-00782-H2-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 1986).
104. Id. at 2.
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out that accounts [receivable] owed to the Debtors were "subject to garnish-
ment in Scotland and England." 105
In In re McLean Industries,"0 6 the court found that failure to make pay-
ments on certain prepetition debts would cause severe disruptions in the
Debtor's foreign work force and could subject the Debtor to criminal and
civil penalties under foreign law. 107 In In re Continental Airlines Corp.,'01
the court authorized payment not to exceed $2,000,000 "necessary and es-
sential in order for Continental to continue its business operations in for-
eign jurisdictions and to avoid the risk of the seizure of its aircraft relative
to Continental's foreign routes."'1 9 The court also noted that payment "is
in the best interests of this estate and its creditors."" 10
In Eastern Air Lines, "' the court authorized payment "to foreign credi-
tors" to whom the Debtor had "prepetition obligations ... incurred in the
ordinary course of business, as shall be necessary to protect and preserve
assets of the estate or foreign operations, in an amount not to exceed
$13,000,000 without prejudice to the Debtor's applying for an increase in
the amount of such authorization."112 "Foreign obligations" were defined
in the Debtor's motion for the order to include, without limitation, "obliga-
tions to. . . employees in foreign countries, governmental authorities, air-
port authorities, taxing authorities, fuel suppliers, maintenance suppliers,
advertising agencies, ground handling services and catering services . . .
essential to . . . foreign operations."' " 3 (What about non-employee law-
yers? Perhaps professional courtesy ends at the border.) The motion had
asserted that the foreign routes "are a particularly important and highly
valuable asset ... and are subject to revocation if operations are not contin-
ued... and are subject to seizure by foreign governments and creditors in
the event Eastern defaults in payment.""' 4
In the motion counsel pointed out "an imminent risk that foreign credi-
tors, including foreign governmental authorities. . . will seize or impound
Eastern's aircraft or prevent such aircraft from entering into their respec-
tive jurisdictions."' ' Eastern's lawyers argued that "governmental author-
105. Id.
106. Case Nos. 86 B 11238, 86 B 12241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1986).
107. Id. at 2.
108. Case No. 83-04020-HI-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1983).
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. Case No. 89 B 10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
112. Id. at 2.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2-3.
115. Id. at 4.
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ities may seek to impose civil or criminal sanctions on Eastern and its
officers and employees for non-payment of Foreign Obligations." ' 1 6 East-
ern also made the usual allegations: "[Playment . . .is essential to the
continued operation of Eastern's business and is in the best interest of East-
ern and its creditors. . . .Nonpayment and the events which would follow
would seriously jeopardize any successful reorganization." '"1 7
C. Best Interest of Creditors and the Debtor
It is very common for courts to apply the Doctrine after making find-
ings of fact to the effect that the use of the Doctrine is in the best interests of
the debtor and its creditors. For example, in Revere Copper and Brass,"'
the court authorized the Debtors to reimburse their employees for prepeti-
tion out-of-pocket business expenses after finding that "the relief requested
is for the best interests of the Debtors' respective estates and creditors."'" 9
Allegations pertaining to payment being in the best interests of the debtor
and creditors can be found in almost all motions and orders pertaining to
the use of the Doctrine.
D. General Business Considerations
In In re John B. Coleman,'20 payment was requested and authorized,
since: "Unless Coleman is authorized to pay the prepetition debt owed to
the Travel Agents, the N.Y. Ritz will be unable to generate new business
• . .and will consequently lose significant revenues and prestige among
luxury hotel clientele." 12' In the motion it also was asserted: "It is vitally
important for the N.Y. Ritz to maintain healthy relations with the Travel
Agents to ensure that they will continue to refer business to the N.Y. Ritz
after the petition date."' 22 In essence, the Debtor claimed that payment
was necessary for the "reorganization to succeed."'' 23
In Allis-Chalmers, 24 the Debtors were authorized to honor all prepeti-
tion and postpetition warranty claims. The accompanying motion stated:
"Abandonment of this policy .. would cause confusion and dissatisfaction
116. Id.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Case Nos. 82 B 12073, 82 B 12086.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Case Nos. 86 B 12242 to -12244 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Motion of April 13, 1987 Order of
April 20, 1987).
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242.
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at a very critical time in the Debtors' history."1 2  Needless to say, the mo-
tion also stated that "the relief requested herein is in their [Debtors'] best
interests, the best interests of their estates and the best interests of their
creditors."' 26 An accompanying affidavit of Ronald J. Burns creatively ad-
ded that the Debtors "cannot risk their future customer base by sending
signals in the short term which could be interpreted by their customers as a
lack of confidence in our long-range viability."' 27 "[The] inability to meet
our warranties will provide a strong impetus for our customers to patronize
our competitors." 128
The court in Wilson Foods'2 9 authorized the Debtor to maintain and
continue to use prepetition bank accounts with the same account numbers;
directed all banks to continue to service the prepetition accounts; author-
ized the Debtor "to transfer monies from affiliated entity to entity, includ-
ing entities that are not debtors herein;" authorized the Debtor "to expend
in its discretion a sum not to exceed five million in the aggregate to pay
essential pre-chapter 11 obligations;" and authorized the Debtor "to con-
tinue to use its existing business forms without alteration or change."' 3 0
The motion for that relief contained the statement: "It is imperative that it
be permitted to continue its existing [bank] accounts in order to avoid inter-
ruption in the normal operations of its businesses."'' Counsel also asserted
that "[tihe returns of any [bank] item would have broad consequences in
the marketplace .... Because of the special priority and secured position,
the clearance of such checks will not prejudice other creditors."' 32 Counsel
for the Debtor alleged that the "Debtor had a net worth in excess of $83
million" and that "[t]he Debtor ha[d] substantial cash balances in the vari-
ous banks."'133 In the motion counsel stated, in part: "Debtor believes that
the 'doctrine of necessity' amply justifies such expenditure, which repre-
sents about .49% of the almost $2.5 billion in annual volume of business
which Debtor generates. Such expenditure by this measure in these cases is
de minimus."'134 The court did not appear to address the issue of whether it
is appropriate to use the same rationale that justifies paying workers imme-
diately because of subsection 507(a)(3) and because they will be paid in full
125. Id. at 2.
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id.
129. Case No. 83-01034A.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2-3.
134. Id. at 4.
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upon confirmation of the plan in order to justify paying unsecured creditors
immediately when the Debtor is solvent. Wilson Foods135 may have con-
tained bankruptcy abuses.
E. Employee Concerns
In Eastern Air Lines,'3 6 relief was granted because "the relief requested
is essential to the continued operation of the Debtor's business."' 1 The
court also found that "the relief requested ... is in the best interests of the
estate, creditors and equity security holders."' 38 The motion stated: "It is
essential that the undue hardships that said employees may suffer as a con-
sequence of the Chapter 11 filing be minimized."' 39 The motion for the
March 9, 1989, Eastern Order was broadly drafted, which is not uncom-
mon. It asserted that checks to employees will be dishonored due to the
Chapter 11 filing, health benefits must be paid for the employees to receive
future medical benefits for a "smooth transition into Chapter 11," and em-
ployee hardships must be minimized to maintain morale. The motion as-
serted that "the currently active employees . . . are among Eastern's most
valued assets. [Their] continued cooperation and support. . . [is] essential
to Eastern's operations and successful reorganization . . . [and] would be
particularly inequitable in view of Section 1114" if the relief were not
granted. '4
In In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,' the court granted a request for relief
similar to the relief requested in Eastern Air Lines.'42 The motion for relief
contained broad assertions such as payment to employees was necessary to
maintain their goodwill and to safeguard them from a lack of funds, which
would result in the employees suffering "extreme hardship" and a "likely
deterioration in morale." In the motion it was pointed out that "many...
if not... most ... amounts proposed to be paid ... relate to claims that
are entitled to priority treatment over general unsecured claims by virtue of
Section 507(a)(3)."' 4 3
135. Case No. 83-01034A.
136. Case No. 89 B 10449.
137. Id. at 1.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 7.
140. Id. at 5-7.
141. Case No. 89 B 10448 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
142. Case No. 89 B 10449.
143. Case No. 89 B 10448, Motion for Relief, at 3-4.
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F Broad, General Allegations
In general, almost all motions pertaining to the use of the Doctrine con-
tained general allegations concerning expected benefits to the debtor, the
estate, creditors, employees and everybody else imaginable. A shot-gun ap-
proach was the rule, not the exception. That is no surprise in view of the
dearth of reported cases pertaining to the Doctrine and the uncertainty of
how a court will view the facts of each case.
VII. NON-FACTORS
It is clear that certain factors do not determine whether the Doctrine
can be applied. The size of the case is not a factor. The Doctrine was
applied in In re Chateaugay Corp. ("LTV"),"4 a large case. It has been
applied in small cases, such as those involving "ma and pa restaurants"
where the sole "chef" threatened to quit unless paid for two days of prepeti-
tion services.
Another non-factor is the Code chapter under which the case is pend-
ing. The Doctrine has been used in Chapter 13 cases, as well as in Chapter
11 cases. There is no reason why it cannot be used in Chapter 12 cases as
well. The nature of the debtor's business is not a factor. The debtor may be
an airline, a restauranteur or a farmer.
The dollar amount involved is not a factor. In LTV, payment of up to
$70,000,000 was approved for health and life insurance benefits to retir-
ees.145 Although a dollar amount was not stated in Eastern Air Lines,'46 the
motion stated that the "salary claims should not exceed approximately
$7,000,000"' 147 plus a sum which "should not exceed approximately
$700,000" for prepetition medical benefits.148 In Ionsphere Clubs, other
amounts requested were as little as $26,000 and $10,000.49 In In re Hart-
man Material Handling Systems ("Allis-Chalmers"),"0 there was no dollar
cap in payment of prepetition warranty claims,' although there was a
$15,000,000 cap on accrued wage, salary and commission benefits. 52 Ap-
144. 64 Bankr. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
145. Id. at 993-94. (Perhaps that's why New York City is called the "BIG apple," rather than
the "LITTLE apple.").
146. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. and In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc. ("Eastern Air Lines"),
Case Nos. 89 B 10448, 89 B 10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Inonsphere Clubs, Case No. 89 B 10448.
150. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1987).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2.
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proval of a category or class of persons without a cap is not the norm, but is
far from being a rarity.153
The number of people receiving payment is not a factor. It is fact-spe-
cific to the case. In LTV,"5 4 approximately 66,000 retirees received pay-
ment. In small cases, only a few persons benefited from postpetition
payments of prepetition wage claims. The net worth of the debtor is often a
reference point,155 but there are insufficient data at this time to determine if
that factor is important.
VIII. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS BEFORE AN ORDER IS SIGNED
A. To Whom Notice Must Be Given
Notice may be "the name of the game," and its importance cannot be
overly stressed. Every court in the cases cited in this Article required some
form of notice to be given to someone before an order was signed utilizing
the Doctrine. Notice is necessary to avoid due process concerns. No deci-
sion has been found specifically addressing the issue of due process and
notice in the sole context of the Doctrine. Since a motion to use the Doc-
trine typically comes early in a case while a crisis is taking place, usually
before a creditors' committee is appointed, it is no surprise that notice is
generally limited to relatively few persons.
153. See, e.g., In re Structurlite Plastics, 86 Bankr. 922 (S.D. Ohio 1988), where requested
payment was rejected, but not due to the sums of money which were to be paid; involved
$65,019.81; In re FCX, Inc., 60 Bankr. 405 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), where requested payment was re-
jected, but not due to the sums requested to be paid; involved $15,000, $1,171,245.67, $43,294.27,
$1,230,727.25 and $332,368.85; see also Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey ("A.H.
Robins"), 832 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1987), where requested payment was rejected by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals; involved $15,000,000. (Had A.H. Robins been pending in New York,
payment may have been approved because the judge would have compared the $15 million to the
cost of a good breakfast in a New York hotel, and considered that sum to be not much more than
petty cash.). Payment not to exceed $2,000,000 was approved in In re Continental Airlines Corp.,
Case No. 83-04019-HI-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1983) ($4,000,000 had been requested). In
In re McLean Indus., Case Nos. 86 B 12238, 86 B 12242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1986), sums
not to exceed $3,870,000, $1,550,000, $3,200,000, $100,000, an unlimited amount for self-insured
workers compensation claims, and $3,200,000 were approved. In In re Revere Copper and Brass,
Case Nos. 82 B 12076, 82 B 12086 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1982), an "aggregate amount not to
exceed $50,000" was approved (Order of December 1, 1982). (Of course, back in 1982, a dollar
was almost worth something.). Some cases limited payments per employee to $2,000 earned
within 90 days, to stay within the subsection 507(a)(3) priority. See, e.g., In re Patrick Cudahy,
Inc., Case No. 87-05413 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 1988). In contrast, in some cases, the sums
paid were very small, e.g., less than a thousand dollars.
154. 64 Bankr. 990.
155. See FCX, 60 Bankr. 405.
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
In In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"56 it appears that an order was signed
on March 9, 1989, based upon the Doctrine with notice only to the United
States trustee. The same was true in its companion case, In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc.'57 The order was signed the same day the case was filed. The
Debtor's motion stated:
In light of the emergency nature of the relief requested herein...
and the irreparable harm to Eastern that will ensue if the relief re-
quested herein is not granted, Eastern submits that it is not feasible
to give any notice and requests that the Court waive and dispense
with the requirement of any furtherance.1 58
In an Eastern motion brought by the Debtor for an order approving
Eastern's Customer Ticket-Holder Relief Program, counsel for Eastern re-
quested that notice of the postpetition payments be limited to the United
States trustee and the "twenty largest creditors; and in light of the circum-
stances and the emergency nature of the relief requested it appearing that
no other notice need be given." '159
In In re Patrick Cudahy, Inc.,1 60 notice was given to the United States
trustee, all secured creditors, major unsecured creditors and all persons who
may have been adversely affected directly by the payments. No creditors'
committee had been formed at the time. In In re Hartman Material Han-
dling Systems ("Allis-Chalmers"),161 notice was given to the counsel for the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, OAR Lenders, Private Lend-
ers, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and the Public Trustee, Offi-
cial Labor/Retiree Committee, those parties in interest who filed a notice of
appearance, the United States trustee and the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC").
In In re Continental Airlines Corp.,162 notice was limited to the Official
Creditors' Committees, secured creditors, the Internal Revenue Service and
the SEC. This order antedated the inception of the United States trustee
program. In In re Global Marine,1 63 notice was given to "secured bank
creditors, to the members of the Creditors' Committee appointed in [two of
twelve] cases, to National Westminster Bank, and to those parties who have
requested notice. . . ."" In In re Revere Copper and Brass,165 notice was
156. Case No. 89 B 10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
157. Case No. 89 B 10448 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
158. Case No. 89 B 10449 (order of Mar. 9, 1989, at 7-8).
159. Id. (motion of Mar. 14, 1989).
160. Case No. 87-05413 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 24, 1987).
161. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1987).
162. Case No. 83-04019-HI-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1983).




given to the Creditors' Committee and the United States trustee. In In re
Chateaugay Corp. ("LTV"), 166 notice was given to certain creditors and to
the United States trustee for an emergency hearing, with the right of inter-
ested persons to more fully address the issues in a full hearing. 167
Without question, the trend is for the court to conduct an emergency
hearing on limited notice, and then give broader notice to a larger group of
interested persons, thus giving all persons an opportunity to be heard. The
relief granted at the emergency hearing is limited as the circumstances
require.
B. How Much Notice Need Be Given
It is not uncommon for a hearing to be conducted the same day the case
is commenced, the motion requesting payment pursuant to the Doctrine
having been filed with the petition. It follows that time factors can be brief.
Heaven help a creditor's counsel who decides to take an afternoon off to
play golf or cricket.
In Eastern Air Lines,168 notice was as short as several hours. Telephone
notice of twenty-four hours and/or overnight courier service was used with
certain motions. In Allis-Chalmers,169 notice of ten days was given. In an-
other Allis-Chalmers matter, apparently the court was asked to approve the
giving of notice of one day "by personal service or by overnight courier."17
In Revere Copper and Brass,17' notice of eight days from the day the motion
was filed and the order was signed was given to interested persons. In
Global Marine,'72 the notice simply was "expedited." In In re Wilson
Foods,1 73 a motion to make payment pursuant to the Doctrine was filed
contemporaneously with the petition (initiating the case). An order utiliz-
ing the Doctrine was signed the same day. The motion stated that creditors
would have sixty days after the order was signed to file an objection to the
order.
165. Case Nos. 82 B 12073, 82 B 12086 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1982).
166. 64 Bankr. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
167. Id. at 992, 994.
168. Case No. 89 B 10449.
169. Case Nos. 87 B 11225 to -11242.
170. Id.
171. Case Nos. 82 B 12073, 82 B 12086.
172. Case Nos. 85-00781-H2-11, 86-00782-H2-11.
173. No. 83-0134A (Bankr. W.D. Okla. April 22, 1983).
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IX. THE RESULT IF THE DEBTOR FAILS TO OBTAIN COURT
AUTHORITY
What happens if a debtor, without court authority, makes postpetition
payment of prepetition debts? This was addressed in In re B & WEnter-
prises, Inc.,' 74 and in a Strook & Strook & Lavan brief in In re Chateaugay
Corp. ("LTV').175 In B & W Enterprises, the Debtor, "without notice,
hearing, or authorization from the supervising bankruptcy court," '76 de-
cided that it should make postpetition payment of certain prepetition debts
for valid business purposes. Later the Chapter 11 case was converted to
Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court allowed the trustee to avoid the payments
to prepetition creditors pursuant to subsection 549(a), which pertains to
avoidance of postpetition transactions, and directed the prepetition credi-
tors to return the funds to the trustee pursuant to Section 550, which per-
tains to liability of a transferee of an avoided transfer. Upon appeal the
creditors argued that the Debtor was permitted to make payment pursuant
to the Six Months Rule and the Necessity of Payment Rule.177 The court
rejected that argument, holding that the Six Months Rule and the Necessity
of Payment Rule were limited to railroad reorganizations,1 78 and the Neces-
sity of Payment Rule may not have been retained in the Code for any pur-
pose or use.179
X. MATTERS TO CONSIDER WHEN THE DOCTRINE MAY BE APPLIED
Because the Doctrine is based in good part on equitable considerations,
it is easy to abuse it. It is important to determine carefully the effect of all
interested persons before the Doctrine is applied. What if there are insuffi-
cient funds to pay everyone on the same level or on a higher priority level
than the people being paid? Will improper or unwise priorities within the
same class be created?
Since, from a practical perspective, recoupment is rarely, if ever, possi-
ble, further questions need to be addressed. Are the payments being made
for a legitimate and lawful purpose? Are the parties crossing over the line
between the proper use of the Doctrine and caving in to the worst form of
economic blackmail? Is the use of the debtor's funds inequitable to persons
who are entitled to, but do not receive, payment? Is there any effect on non-
174. 713 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983).
175. 64 Bankr. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
176. B & WEnterprises, 713 F.2d at 535.
177. Id. at 537.




debtors who are guarantors of the debtor's obligations or who have personal
liability, e.g., liability for taxes? How much discretion should the debtor be
given in distributing the funds? Should there be a watchdog? Will the utili-
zation make it more, or less, difficult for the debtor to confirm a plan?
What will be the effect on the ability of the debtor to pay prepetition and
postpetition taxes? Has sufficient attention been given to due process re-
quirements? Will the use violate basic principles of bankruptcy law, i.e., the
collectivization process and the avoidance of using economic muscle to ob-
tain personal gains in getting one's claim paid to the exclusion of others?
A bankruptcy case is "a collective proceeding for the determination and
payment of debts."18  There is a policy against "grabbing by creditors."' 1
"[T]he pickings of anyone less civil will be fetched back into the pool."' 82
Will payment violate these basic policies?
XI. COMMENTS REGARDING SEVERAL CASES
In re Chateaugay Corp. ("LTV"), 83 which continues to wind its way
through the courts, illustrates the proper application of the Doctrine. The
Debtors and related corporations, with the support of the Official Commit-
tee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors Committee") to whom the Debtors
owed in excess of $3,500,000,000, asked the court on July 30, 1986, for
authority to make payment of up to $70,000,000 for health, medical, and
life insurance benefits for approximately 66,000 retirees.184 Earlier, on the
day the petition was filed, July 17, 1986, the bankruptcy court had signed
an order, over the objections of secured banks, which "authorized and em-
powered the [D]ebtors (collectively 'LTV') to pay certain prepetition wages
and salaries, reimbursement expenses, and employee benefits" for current
employees.185 Because the obligation to make the retiree benefit payments
was prepetition, the Debtors had stopped payment when the petition was
filed. This "caused enormous stress for the many elderly retirees and their
families who were left without medical or life insurance coverage."' 8 6 Pay-
ments by the Debtors were their lifeline. Nonpayment by the Debtors pre-
180. Levit, Trustee of V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co. v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d




183. 80 Bankr. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), 76 Bankr. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), 64 Bankr. 990
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), appeals dismissed, 838 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1988).
184. LTV, 64 Bankr. at 992.
185. LTV, 80 Bankr. at 280.
186. LTV, 64 Bankr. at 992.
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cipitated a devastating strike. The court allowed the retiree payments in its
July 30, 1986, order, after assurances that the Debtors had the cash to make
the payments and with the support of two major unions and the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). 187
In bankruptcy court, Chateaugay ("LTV") and the Creditors' Commit-
tee had successfully argued that payment was permitted pursuant to subsec-
tion 363(b), which permits the use of property other than in the ordinary
course of business after notice and a hearing. There was "a sound business
reason" for the use, as required by In re Lionel Corp.'88 Upon appeal of the
July 30 order, the district court took no issue with the actions of the bank-
ruptcy court, found that an appeal was "not appropriate at this time,"189
and remanded "in order to enable the Bankruptcy Judge to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law in completion of the decision-making process
he initiated." 190
A later Chateaugay ("LTV") appeal pertained to the State of Michigan,
Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation and Self-Insurers' Security
Fund. 9' Michigan appealed because, although "LTV resumed payment of
workers' compensation claims in some but not all states," payments were
not made to Michigan claimants, and Michigan argued that the Debtor was
required to "treat all prepetition workers' compensation claims alike."' 92
On appeal, the district court held that the bankruptcy court's order was
interlocutory and the bankruptcy judge "neither erred nor abused his dis-
cretion in issuing the order."' 93 The court (in now often quoted language)
stated:
A rigid application of the priorities of § 507 would be inconsistent
with the fundamental purpose of reorganization and of the Act's
grant of equity powers to bankruptcy courts, which is to create a
flexible mechanism that will permit the greatest likelihood of sur-
vival of the debtor and payment of creditors in full or at least pro-
portionately. The Supreme Court has emphasized the special nature
of reorganization proceedings. 194
187. Id. at 992, 993, 998 n.15.
188. 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983).
189. LTV, 64 Bankr. at 999.
190. Id. at 992.
191. LTV, 80 Bankr. at 280.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 287.
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In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 195 gives an in-depth analysis of a view of
the Doctrine by two very fine bankruptcy judges skilled in all aspects of the
Doctrine. Chief Judge Burton R. Lifland reviewed an order signed by
Judge Tina L. Brozman and entered approximately two weeks earlier,
"granting Eastern's motion to pay certain pre-petition wage, salary, medical
benefit and business expense claims of its active employees."' 96 The IAM,
supported by the Air Lines Pilots Association, International ("ALPA") and
the Transport Workers of America, moved for an Order authorizing and
directing Eastern to pay similar benefits to union-represented striking em-
ployees for services rendered before the petition was filed; ALPA also asked
for payment of prepetition sick leave benefits and medical expenses of the
employees on sick or disability leave.
IAM argued that all prepetition wage and salary claims of active em-
ployees and IAM-represented employees then on strike were subsection
507(a)(3) priority claims which must be treated identically. The bank-
ruptcy court disposed of that argument by applying subsection 363(b), by
applying Lionel Corp., and by finding that the Debtor did "articulate
some business justification, other than mere appeasement of major credi-
tors, for using, selling or leasing property out of the ordinary course of
business . ,."' The articulated business purposes were "to preserve and
protect its business and ultimately reorganize, retain its currently working
employees and maintain positive employee morale." 199
Judge Lifland ruled that courts are empowered by subsection 105(a) to
invoke the Doctrine.2' The court drew a parallel between the Railway La-
bor Act and the Code, noting that railroad-related law contains the Neces-
sity of Payment Rule recognizing judicial power to authorize payment of
prepetition claims where it is essential to the continued operation of the
Debtor, as well as the Six Months Rule which permits railroad debtors to
pay for goods delivered within six months of the filing date of a railroad
reorganization.2°' The court pointed out that Judge Learned Hand applied
the Necessity of Payment Rule to a non-railroad debtor in Dudley v. Mea-
195. 98 Bankr. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (This is the cite which refers to In re Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., Case No. 89 B 10449 (BLR) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989), and its companion case, In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., Case No. 89 B 10448 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
196. Id. at 174-75.
197. 722 F.2d at 1069 (cited in 98 Bankr. at 175).
198. Eastern Air Lines, 98 Bankr. at 175; accord In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 780 F.2d
1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 Bankr. 888, 905-06 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1984).
199. Eastern Air Lines, 98 Bankr. at 175.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 176.
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ley,202 holding that a "court was not 'helpless' to apply the rule to non-
railroad debtors where the alternative was a cessation of operations."2 °3
Although Judge Lifland noted that railroad reorganization law supports the
Doctrine of Necessity, he was careful not to transplant the Six Months Rule
or the Necessity of Payment Doctrine directly into Chapter 11 non-railroad
cases.
The Eastern Air Lines court responded to arguments that there must be
equality among creditors, stating that such a policy "may be of significance
in liquidation cases under Chapter 7, [sic] however, the paramount policy
and goal of Chapter 11, to which all other bankruptcy policies are
subordinated, is the rehabilitation of the debtor." 2" The court relied on
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,2 °5 "which stated, '[t]he fundamental purpose
of reorganization is to prevent the debtor from going into liquidation, with
an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.' "206
The court also looked to legislative history and stated: "[T]he Bankruptcy
Court's equitable power may be used to effectuate the purposes of Chapter
11, which include the 'restructuring of a business' finances to enable it to
operate productively, provide jobs for its employees, pay its creditors and
produce a return for its stockholders.' "207
The Eastern Air Lines court disposed of arguments as to equity between
persons of the same class by indicating that subsection 1123(a) applies "in
the context of a plan of reorganization, and is of significance only when the
debtor is ready to emerge from Chapter 1 1.28 This case was two weeks
old when the order was entered, and the court believed that it was "prema-
ture" to consider the issue of equity "since it goes to the heart of a reorgani-
zation plan and not to which claims are necessary to be paid at this point in
time to keep Eastern operating and to protect and preserve estate assets. '20 9
The court pointed out that, "even in the context of reorganization, a major-
ity of both cases and commentators have rejected the concept that all credi-
tors of equal rank must receive equal treatment."2 10
202. 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945).
203. Eastern Air Lines, 98 Bankr. at 176 (citing Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.
1945), cert denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945)).
204. Id.
205. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
206. Eastern Air Lines, 98 Bankr. at 177 (quoting Bildisco v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 588
(1984)).
207. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 16 (1977), reprinted in U.S.






The court noted that Section 1123 "does require the same treatment for
each claim or interest of a particular class. However, it does not automati-
cally follow that all creditors of equal rank must be treated alike."' 21' The
court stated that "a debtor may place claimants of the same rank in differ-
ent classes and thereby provide different treatment for each respective
class, ' '2 12 agreeing that a "plan should not arbitrarily classify or discrimi-
nate against creditors . ,2. 3 The court also noted that "[a] bankruptcy
court can permit discrimination when the facts of the case justify it."214
The court concluded by stating: "[T]his court has a duty to maintain the
estate for the benefit of all creditors. ' 215 The court reasoned that payment
to IAM members would benefit only IAM members, not the estate or its
creditors. The fact that Eastern was sitting on more than $200,000,000 in
cash and had the ability to pay was insufficient; there was no necessity to
pay. The main argument of the Unions, for "equity," would be dealt with
at the proper time when a proposed plan would be before the court. The
motion of IAM was denied.216
The court in Lionel Corp.217 substantiated the Doctrine and set forth the
following: "To further the purposes of Chapter 11 reorganization, a bank-
ruptcy judge must have substantial freedom to tailor his orders to meet
differing circumstances. This is exactly the result a liberal reading of sec-
tion 363(b) will achieve. 21 8 This decision is helpful because it keeps judges
out of a straitjacket and gives courts the ability to act within established
bankruptcy law and practice.
Another case frequently cited in briefs as authority for the requested use
of the Doctrine is In re Southern Biotech, Inc..219 It states in part: "The
fact that there is no express authorization in the Code [to purchase all cor-
porate stock of a nondebtor corporation] should not preclude authorization
to enter into the transaction unless there is specific prohibition against the
proposed transaction. ' 220 Courts must be careful before relying on that
language, however, as there are many improper actions which are not spe-
cifically prohibited by the Code. The Code is not drafted to detail every act
which is permitted or is not permitted. What may or may not be done is
211. Id.
212. Id. at 177-78.
213. Id. at 178 (quoting In re LeBlanc, 622 F.2d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1980)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 178-79.
217. 722 F.2d 1063.
218. Id. at 1069.
219. 37 Bankr. 318 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
220. Id. at 323.
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often determined by the facts of a case. The Code does state with reason-
able clarity most of the concepts and principles which are needed to resolve
a typical case.
In re Structurlite Plastics Corp."z' illustrates the reasoning of courts
when use of the Doctrine is requested. When the Doctrine is invoked, ob-
jections are the exception, not the rule, as everyone acknowledges that its
use is for the common good. In Structurlite, the Chapter 11 Debtor moved
to assume an executory contract and to pay prepetition employee medical
claims. The Official Committee of Creditors objected. A collective bargain-
ing agreement was in effect when the petition was filed, and it contained a
medical trust agreement provision which required payment to hourly em-
ployees of health, disability and life insurance benefits. Non-union salaried
employees were entitled to the same self-funded benefits. Several employees
faced collection efforts by medical providers due to nonpayment of medical
expenses of catastrophic illnesses of dependents. The court refused to allow
payment immediately, but it left open the possibility of future payment.
The court held that the medical trust agreement was not an executory
contract.222
The Debtor's only significant obligation was to fund the trust paying the
bills. The court acknowledged that it may be possible in "rare instances" to
pay prepetition debt, provided that it was "convinced ... that authorizing
the payment of the prepetition debt creates 'the greatest likelihood of...
payment of creditors in full or at least proportionately.' ,,223 The court per-
mitted subsection 507(a)(4) to be used for payment within its limits. This
decision does not state that the Doctrine can never be applied; it simply
prohibited its use under the facts of this case.
On the other hand, the decision in In re FCX, Inc.22 is disconcerting,
since a district court reversed the bankruptcy court and indicated that sub-
section 105(a) cannot be used to create rights otherwise unavailable under
applicable law in order to pay a total of $1,214,539.94 to employees plus
$1,563,095.60 to grain producers. 225 The district court refused to authorize
payment pursuant to subsection 105(a), subsection 365(b) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1481. The court acknowledged that "'[t]he bankruptcy court has the
221. 86 Bankr. 922 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
222. Id. at 933, 927. Query: Would the result have been different if the court had used the
Andrew definition of executory contract rather than the Countryman definition? See supra, note
25 and accompanying text.
223. Structurlite, 86 Bankr. at 932 (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp. ("LTY"), 80 Bankr. at
279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
224. 60 Bankr. 405 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
225. Id. at 407.
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power to shift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice
or unfairness is not done in administration of the bankrupt estate.' "226 The
court also said: "[T]he bankruptcy court has the ability to deviate from the
rules of priority and distribution set forth in the Code in the interest of
justice and equity . . . [but] cannot use this flexibility . . . to establish a
ranking of priorities within priorities." 2 7
The FCX court was concerned that the effect of making these payments
would be to subordinate a claim to other claims within the same class,228
even though the Debtor had a net worth of $12,000,000 and there was a
reasonable "probability that all unsecured creditors eventually will be paid
.... "
229 The payments were prohibited because "[i]t is simply inequitable
to settle certain claims prior to the filing of a reorganization plan; such
action may be detrimental to the remaining unsecured creditors if the reor-
ganization fails and the estate has to be liquidated."230 The court stated
that subsection 507(a)(3) claims could be paid to the extent of their
priority.231
Since the use of the Doctrine is fact-specific and its use is well-founded
in bankruptcy law, it is a little disconcerting for a court to take a position
that there is no legal basis for its use. Perhaps the result would have been
different if the facts of the case had been different, if the case would have
been argued or presented in a different manner, or if some of the cases re-
ferred to in this Article had been decided prior to the time the district court
rendered its decision in 1986.
Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Mabey ("A.H. Rob-
ins" )232 is a controversial decision. The district court had directed the
Debtor to establish a $15,000,000 "emergency treatment fund" to defray
the cost of providing tubal reconstructive surgery or in-vitro fertilization for
women injured while using the Dalkon Shield.2 33 The examiner, the com-
mittee of injured persons, and future claimants supported the motion. The
district court's order establishing the $15,000,000 fund was reversed.234
The Fourth Circuit, rejecting the lower court's reliance on subsection
105(a), said that equitable powers emanating from Section 105 "are not a
226. Id. at 409 (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 410.
229. Id. at 408.
230. Id. at 412.
231. Id.
232. 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987).




license for a court to disregard the clear language and meaning of the bank-
ruptcy statutes and rules." '235 The Fourth Circuit stated: "[T]he fact that a
proceedings [sic] is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating discre-
tion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of justice
and fairness, however enlightened those views may be." 236 The court also
held that a pre-confirmation "distribution to unsecured creditors in a Chap-
ter 11 proceeding" was not permitted.237 It held that the distribution vio-
lated sections 1122-1129 and Bankruptcy Rule 3021 which "allows
distribution to creditors only after the allowance of claims and the confir-
mation of a plan. '2 31
Some of our finest bankruptcy scholars have criticized the A.H. Robins
decision. The most perceptive and insightful comments are those of Profes-
sor Douglas A. Baird at a recent seminar for bankruptcy judges:
[T]he Fourth Circuit suffered from a case of the 'naives.' Payments
to creditors before confirmation of the plan of reorganization do
happen in Chapter 11. The typical case that we hardly give any
thought to is the payment of prepetition wages to workers. These
payments are formally endorsed in the context of executory con-
tracts through its requirement that the debtor cure defaults on exec-
utory contracts that it wants to assume. To be sure, payments to
prepetition creditors are inherently suspicious. The whole point of
bankruptcy is to force everyone to work together. People should not
be able to opt out.
. . . We do not have these tort victims exerting any hold-up
power. It is not as if they are suppliers that the firm needs. But the
people who we are talking about are in fact entitled to money. There
seems little possibility that they will not get at least as much eventu-
ally as they are getting under the plan. Whatever they get now will
count against what they get later. No one is likely to be hurt by
paying them now. . . . [P]aying them now may be in everyone's
interest. These women need the operation now and many will not
have it unless they get the money now. If they do not get the opera-
tion now, but have to wait five years they may be too old to have
children and the surgery will not do any good. In that event, their
claims would not be for their difficulty in having children, but for
being deprived of the ability to have any children at all. The owners
of a firm prefer the first lawsuit to the second. If you give them the
235. Id. at 302.





money now, you can reduce the exposure of the corporation to these
tort claims.
The effect of providing the surgery to those who want it now
may be to reduce the claim of these victims against the corporation
later. All the owners of Robins may be better off if these payments
are made. Of course, what has to happen is that you have to balance
the cost of the operation and the possibility that the women will get
a larger share than they would otherwise be entitled to against the
potential savings to the estate.239
It is difficult to disagree with the critics of the A.H. Robins decision.
The people who objected to the use of the Doctrine were not those persons
who were most seriously injured when the Doctrine could not be used -
the women who required immediate surgery and, perhaps, the unsecured
creditors who may be required to accept a smaller percentage of their debt
due to substantially increased claims of the injured women.
The A.H. Robins decision is all the more puzzling in view of the flexibil-
ity ordinarily granted to bankruptcy courts when the court takes action for
the common good. In re Longardner & Associates, Inc. 2  is not a Doctrine
of Necessity case, but it shows how bankruptcy courts can act in unusual
circumstances. In Longardner, the bankruptcy court would not set aside a
confirmed Chapter 11 plan at a creditor's request, even though the creditor
had not received notice of entry of the order confirming the plan. The
bankruptcy court strictly interpreted Section 1144. The district court and
the court of appeals affirmed. The creditor wanted the bankruptcy court to
exercise "its equitable powers to provide relief. . . in this case," notwith-
standing Section 1144.241 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals said: "We
agree that the bankruptcy court as a court of equity could have fashioned
relieffor the creditor.'24 ' The Seventh Circuit then went on to remind us of
its earlier statement: "Although a reorganization court is indeed a court of
equity,. . . it is yet constrained by the dictates of the Bankruptcy Act."
2 43
Yet, bankruptcy courts need and have the ability under appropriate reme-
239. D. Baird, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking in an Uncertain World, SEMINAR FOR BANK-
RUPTCY JUDGES, A FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER PROGRAM, San Antonio, Texas, May 20, 1988,
at 17-18.
240. 855 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1130 (1988).
241. Id. at 462.
242. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
243. Id. (quoting In re Chicago M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 830 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 1987)); see
also Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) ("[W]hatever equitable powers




dies to fashion relief, and this understanding by a court of appeals of the
unique needs of bankruptcy courts is refreshing.
XII. CONSISTENCY
The same lawyers were involved in many of the cases referred to in this
Article. The lawyers proceeded to use the theory that, if something works
in one case, it should work in another case with relatively similar facts.
There is a substantial amount of repetition in the briefs and pleadings, and
cross references are common. For example, the Memorandum of Law in
Support of Eastern Air Lines' Motion to Pay Foreign Creditors states: "All
of the arguments raised by Continental Air Lines [sic], when its identical
request was approved by a bankruptcy judge in Texas, apply equally to
Eastern." 2" Similarly, the courts used consistent language in orders.
Bankruptcy courts tend to believe that there is some benefit to adhering to
precedents and not needlessly unsettling established law without a compel-
ling reason to do so.
XIII. PUTrING IT ALL TOGETHER - RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
USE OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
There must be a specific positive purpose for use of the Doctrine. Each
utilization of the Doctrine should begin with a quick review of the under-
pinnings of the Doctrine to make certain that the intended application is
not outside its generally accepted scope. The Doctrine should not be used
by default or merely because it is convenient to do so, nor should it be used
when the problem can be resolved in a conventional manner. It is a Doc-
trine of necessity, not a Doctrine of convenience. Ability to pay is of little, if
any, consequence.
Courts should be cautious and use the Doctrine sparingly. The Doc-
trine should not be used if there is no real emergency. Use of the Doctrine
should be an exception, not a general rule. Provisions of the Code, such as
subsection 507(a)(3), exist for a purpose. The farther the debtor is into a
case, the less likely it is that the Doctrine should be applied. When the
Code provisions are clear, they should be followed. Mr. Justice Holmes
said, in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. May,2"5 that "[s]ome play
must be allowed for the joints of the machine . . ,2,6 This means that
there must be some play in the system utilizing recognized law and con-
cepts, not some play with the system. Playing with the system will result in
244. In re Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Case No. 89 B 10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1989).
245. 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
246. Id. at 270; see also In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983).
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
judicial anarchy and uncertainty of the law, both of which are highly
destructive.
The Doctrine must not be used if, and/or when, the result is to sanction
blackmail. Bankruptcy is structured so that "might" does not make
"right." Improper "deals" should not be permitted. Professor Douglas G.
Baird said: "The question you have to ask in every case is whether the
Bankruptcy Code gives you the discretion to take account of the realities of
the situation."247 Only when the answer to the question is "yes" can the
Doctrine be considered for use. It should be likely that the people receiving
funds when the Doctrine is applied will receive at least as much as it is
anticipated they will eventually get under the plan.248 Furthermore, there
must be no person "likely to be hurt" if the Doctrine is applied.249 The
Doctrine must not be applied unless the equities are clearly and strongly in
favor of its use. The nature of the request should be reasonable under the
existing circumstances.
When using the Doctrine, a detailed record with specific findings must
be made. The findings should include, among other things: who received
notice of the hearing; how much notice was given; who, if anyone, objected
to the relief requested (since in the great majority of cases where the Doc-
trine has been applied, the court has proceeded with the consent of the
parties or without great opposition, which remains good policy); the equi-
ties of all directly-affected persons; who, if anyone, is harmed, and the de-
gree of harm; whether the use of the Doctrine was necessary to prevent the
immediate collapse of the case; why the use of the Doctrine is in the best
interests of the estate; and what the probable effects will be if the Doctrine
is or is not applied. In addition, the court should inquire into whether the
debtor is worth saving and the reasonable likelihood of a successful plan.
There should be a hearing in the nature of an emergency hearing pursu-
ant to Bankruptcy Rule 4001(b) which is held at the outset of many Chap-
ter 11 cases following a motion for the use of cash collateral. Testimony
should be taken. Special care must be taken before payment is authorized,
as the disbursement of funds pursuant to the Doctrine does not lend itself to
simple controls.
Because of the emergency nature of the request, notice of the first hear-
ing will necessarily be limited both as to time factors and the persons receiv-
ing notice. The notice should be in writing. It should clearly state the date,
time and place of the hearing, the purpose of the hearing, the persons who





are to benefit from the payments, in what amounts proposed payments are
to be made, and the source of the funds. The amount of notice (time) for
the hearing must be fact-specific. Notice must be given to as many persons
as is reasonably possible. There is little reason why notice of even a few
hours cannot be given to the United States trustee, major secured creditors,
all taxing authorities, the SEC, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the
twenty (more or less) largest unsecured creditors, and labor unions. In ma-
jor cases most interested persons obtain counsel prior to the filing of the
petition, and the names of their attorneys are known. Notice of a second
hearing should be more broad both as to time and the mailing list of persons
receiving notice.
The trend is for courts to schedule a second hearing, in the nature of a
review. As was the case with the notice of the first hearing, the type of
notice, time factors and persons receiving the notice must be fact-specific.
When possible, a court should consider limiting the relief granted at the
first hearing pending the completion of the second hearing.
XIV. CONCLUSION
Should there be a place in bankruptcy law for the Doctrine of Neces-
sity? Yes. It is a vital tool if courts are to take seriously the purpose of
Chapter 11, L e., "to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue
to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a
return for its stockholders."25 0 The Doctrine carries with it tremendous
power which must be harnessed in an intelligent manner. Its development
is still in its infancy. Energies should be concentrated on setting guidelines,
parameters and ground rules. While this Article is the first on the subject,
undoubtedly it will not be the last.
250. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1015 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, 5787, 5963, 6197).
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